ISO/TR 11633-2:2009

Health informatics — Information security management for remote maintenance of medical devices and medical information systems — Part 2: Implementation of an information security management system (ISMS)

ISO/TR 11633‑2:2009 provides an example of selected and applied "controls" for RMS security based on the definition in the ISMS, on the basis of the risk analysis result mentioned in ISO/TR 11633‑1. ISO/TR 11633‑2:2009 excludes the handling of the communication problems and the use of encryption method. ISO/TR 11633‑2:2009 consists of: a catalogue of types of security environment in health care facilities and RMS providers; an example of combinations of threats and vulnerabilities identified under the environment in the "use cases"; an example of the evaluation and effectiveness based on the "controls" defined in the ISMS.

Informatique de santé — Management de la sécurité de l'information pour la maintenance à distance des dispositifs médicaux et des systèmes d'information médicale — Partie 2: Mise en oeuvre d'un système de management de la sécurité de l'information (ISMS)

General Information

• Status: Withdrawn
• Publication Date: 05-Nov-2009
• Withdrawal Date: 05-Nov-2009
• ICS: 35.240.80 - IT applications in health care technology
• Technical Committee: ISO/TC 215 - Health informatics
• Drafting Committee: ISO/TC 215/WG 4 - Security, Safety and Privacy
• Current Stage: 9599 - Withdrawal of International Standard
• Completion Date: 13-Feb-2021

Relations

• Revised: ISO/TR 11633-2:2021 - Health informatics — Information security management for remote maintenance of medical devices and medical information systems — Part 2: Implementation of an information security management system (ISMS)
• Effective Date: 23-Apr-2020

Standards Content (Sample)

TECHNICAL ISO/TR
REPORT 11633-2
First edition
2009-11-15

Health informatics — Information security
management for remote maintenance of
medical devices and medical information
systems —
Part 2:
Implementation of an information security
management system (ISMS)
Informatique de santé — Management de la sécurité de l'information
pour la maintenance à distance des dispositifs médicaux et des
systèmes d'information médicale —
Partie 2: Mise en oeuvre d'un système de management de la sécurité
de l'information (ISMS)




Reference number
ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
©
ISO 2009

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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
Contents Page
Foreword .iv
Introduction.v
1 Scope.1
2 Terms and definitions .1
3 Abbreviated terms.3
4 Application of ISMS to remote maintenance services.3
4.1 Overview.3
4.2 Compliance scope.5
4.3 Security policy.6
4.4 Assessing risks .6
4.5 Risks to be managed.7
4.6 Identification of risks that are not described in this part of ISO/TR 11633 .8
4.7 Treating risks .8
5 Security management measures for remote maintenance services.9
6 Approving residual risks .9
7 Security audit.10
7.1 Security audit of remote maintenance services.10
7.2 Recommendation of security audit by third parties .10
Annex A (informative) Example of risk assessment in remote maintenance services .11
Bibliography.66

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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies
(ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO
technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been
established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and
non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.
International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.
The main task of technical committees is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards
adopted by the technical committees are circulated to the member bodies for voting. Publication as an
International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the member bodies casting a vote.
In exceptional circumstances, when a technical committee has collected data of a different kind from that
which is normally published as an International Standard (“state of the art”, for example), it may decide by a
simple majority vote of its participating members to publish a Technical Report. A Technical Report is entirely
informative in nature and does not have to be reviewed until the data it provides are considered to be no
longer valid or useful.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
ISO/TR 11633-2 was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 215, Health informatics.
ISO/TR 11633 consists of the following parts, under the general title Health informatics — Information security
management for remote maintenance of medical devices and medical information systems:
⎯ Part 1: Requirements and risk analysis
⎯ Part 2: Implementation of an information security management system (ISMS)

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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
Introduction
Progress and spread of technology in information and communication fields and well-arranged infrastructure
based on them have brought various changes into modern society. In the healthcare field, information
systems formerly closed in each healthcare facility are now connected by networks, and they are coming to
the point of being able to facilitate mutual use of health information accumulated in each information system.
Such information and communication networks are spreading, not only amongst healthcare facilities but also
amongst healthcare facilities and vendors of medical devices or healthcare information systems. By practicing
so-called “remote maintenance services” (RMS), it becomes possible to reduce down-time and lower costs.
However, such connections with external organizations have come to bring healthcare facilities and vendors
not only benefits but also risks regarding confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and systems,
risks which previously received scant consideration.
Based on the information offered by this part of ISO/TR 11633, healthcare facilities and RMS providers will be
able to perform the following activities:
⎯ clarify risks originating from using the RMS, where environmental conditions of the requesting vendor site
(RSC) and maintenance target healthcare facility site (HCF) can be selected from the catalogue in
Annex A;
⎯ grasp the essentials of selecting and implementing both technical and non-technical “controls” to be
applied in their own facility against the risks described in this part of ISO/TR 11633;
⎯ request concrete countermeasures from business partners, as this document can identify the relevant
security risks;
⎯ clarify the boundary of responsibility between the healthcare facility owner and the RMS provider;
⎯ plan a programme for risk retention or transfer as residual risks are clarified when selecting the
appropriate “controls”.
By implementing the risk assessment and employing “controls” referencing this part of ISO/TR 11633,
healthcare facilities owners and RMS providers will be able to obtain the following benefits:
⎯ it will only be necessary to do the risk assessment for those organizational areas where this part of
ISO/TR 11633 is not applicable, therefore, the risk assessment effort can be significantly reduced;
⎯ it will be easy to show the validity of the RMS security countermeasures to a third party;
⎯ if providing RMS to two or more sites, the provider can apply countermeasures consistently and
efficiently.

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TECHNICAL REPORT ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)

Health informatics — Information security management for
remote maintenance of medical devices and medical
information systems —
Part 2:
Implementation of an information security management system
(ISMS)
1 Scope
This part of ISO/TR 11633 provides an example of selected and applied “controls” for RMS security based on
the definition in the ISMS, on the basis of the risk analysis result mentioned in ISO/TR 11633-1. This part of
ISO/TR 11633 excludes the handling of the communication problems and the use of encryption method.
This part of ISO/TR 11633 consists of:
⎯ a catalogue of types of security environment in healthcare facilities and RMS providers;
⎯ an example of combinations of threats and vulnerabilities identified under the environment in the “use
cases”;
⎯ an example of the evaluation and effectiveness based on the “controls” defined in the ISMS.
2 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
2.1
accountability
property that ensures that the actions of an entity may be traced uniquely to the entity
[ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004, definition 2.1]
2.2
asset
anything that is of value to the organization
NOTE 1 Adapted from ISO/IEC 13335-1.
NOTE 2 In the context of health information security, information assets include:
a) health information;
b) IT services;
c) hardware;
d) software;
e) communication facilities;
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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
f) media;
g) IT facilities;
h) medical devices that record or report data.
2.3
assurance
result of a set of compliance processes through which an organization achieves confidence in the status of its
information security management
2.4
availability
property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity
[ISO 13335-1:2004, definition 2.4]
2.5
compliance assessment
processes by which an organization confirms that the information security controls put in place remain both
operational and effective
NOTE Legal compliance relates specifically to the security controls put in place to deliver the requirements of
relevant legislation such as the European Union Directive on the protection of personal data.
2.6
confidentiality
property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes
[ISO 13335-1:2004, definition 2.6]
2.7
data integrity
property that data have not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner
[ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999, definition 3.1.1]
2.8
information governance
processes by which an organization obtains assurance that the risks to its information, and thereby the
operational capabilities and integrity of the organization, are effectively identified and managed
2.9
information security
preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information
NOTE Other properties, particularly accountability of users, but also authenticity, non-repudiation, and reliability, are
often mentioned as aspects of information security, but could be considered as derived from the three core properties in
the definition.
2.10
risk
combination of the probability of an event and its consequence
[ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002, definition 3.1.1]
2.11
risk assessment
overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation
[ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002, definition 3.3.1]
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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
2.12
risk management
coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk
NOTE Risk management typically includes risk assessment, risk treatment, risk acceptance and risk communication.
[ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002, definition 3.1.7]
2.13
risk treatment
process of selection and implementation of measures to modify (typically reduce) risk
NOTE Adapted from ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002.
2.14
system integrity
property that a system performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or
accidental unauthorized manipulation of the system
2.15
threat
potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a system or organization
NOTE Adapted from ISO/IEC 13335-1.
2.16
vulnerability
weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by a threat
NOTE Adapted from ISO/IEC 13335-1.
3 Abbreviated terms
⎯ HCF Healthcare facility
⎯ ISP Information-stealing programme
⎯ ISMS Information security management system
⎯ PHI Personal health information
⎯ RMS Remote maintenance services
⎯ RSC Remote maintenance service centre
⎯ RSS Remote maintenance service security
⎯ VPN Virtual private network
4 Application of ISMS to remote maintenance services
4.1 Overview
The information security management system (ISMS) is a mechanism that operates as a series of
plan/do/check/act processes under the security policy. This series of processes means that the organization
plans out proper security measures (plan), puts those security measures into practice (do), reviews those
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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
security measures (check), and reconsiders them if necessary (act). The ISMS is already standardized
internationally as ISO/IEC 27001, therefore, it is convenient to construct and operate an ISMS referring to
ISO/IEC 27001. This also helps to persuade patients, medical treatment evaluation organizations, and others
of the efficacity of the security measures.
General steps of ISMS construction are shown in Figure 1.
Phase 3
Phase 1 Phase 2
Phase 1
InformInformatiatioon assets,n assets, threats threats,, vu vullnnerabierabilliititieses, ef, efffeectscts
STSTEP 1EP 1 STEP 2 STSTEP 3EP 3 STSTEP 9EP 9 STSTEP 1EP 100
DefiDefinining the ng the PPllannianning a ng a LLiisst ot off m manageanagemment ent PPrreparieparinng a g a
CrCriittereriiaa fo forr car carrryiying oung out rt riisk sk
Planning AlAllloowwiinngg
range to wrange to whhiicch h systemsystematiaticc goalgoals and possis and possiblblee SSttatematemeennt of t of
ISMS mmaanagenagemmeentnt ISISMMSS to be to be
approach to rapproach to riisk sk contrcontroollss AApplppliiccabiabilliityty
the ISthe ISMMSS
policies (the organi(the organizazatitionon’’ss approach, approach, carricarried oued outt
applappliieess assessassessmmeentnt LLiisst ot off addi addititionalonal
mmeethod of analthod of analysiysiss, and , and lleevelvel
controlcontrolss thatthat are not are not i inn
of assurance requiof assurance requirred)ed)
the ISthe ISMMSS cri critterieriaa
STSTEP 4EP 4 STSTEP 5EP 5 STSTEP 6EP 6 STSTEP 7EP 7 STSTEP 8EP 8
SSeeleleccttiningg AApprovipproving ng
IdentifyiIdentifyinng g PPeerformrformiing ng PPeerformrformiing ng
MManageanagemmentent resiresidualdual ri riskssks
Range to Range to PPoolliicy cy SSttatematemeennt of t of
ririsskkss ririsk treatmsk treatmentent rriisk trsk treatmeatmentent
goalgoals and s and
Whwhich ISich ISMMSS statemstatementent AAppplpliiccabiabilliittyy
controlcontrolss
applappliieses
LiList ost off ReResusulltt ResulResultt CCrrititeerriaia f foorr RecorRecordd of  of
rriisks sks report for report for report for report for mmeeasures asures approviapprovinng g
iinnventorventory oy off ririsskk ririsskk takentaken rreesisidualdual r riiskssks
assetsassets assessassessmmeentnt treatmtreatmentent

Figure 1 — ISMS steps
Security measures for protecting personal information in the remote maintenance services (RMS) are
described below in accordance with the concepts of ISMS.
Both the healthcare organization and the RMS provider should construct the appropriate ISMS. Additionally,
the healthcare organization should ideally do the work to adjust the information security management among
all RMS providers to protect personal information. The RMS connects the network of the RMS provider and
the network of the healthcare organization. After connecting these networks, there are risks of new security
holes being created. In the RMS, a different problem may occur in system construction in a single
organization, because the RMS acts between the healthcare organization and the remote maintenance
service centre (RSC), two organizations that are independent of each other. It will therefore be a burden on
both the healthcare organization and RSC, if security measures are not considered an integral part of the
RMS from the outset. In this regard, using ISMS (a well-evaluated technique) can be considered as a better
way to implement RMS security efficiently.
Under many jurisdictional laws for personal information protection, the healthcare organization will assume the
obligations and responsibilities of being custodian of the personal information. In the RMS, the healthcare
organization should request, from the RMS provider, appropriate measures for protecting personal information
because the provider will access the target device set up in a healthcare facility from the RSC through the
network. The healthcare organization must independently adjust all RMS providers' information security
management systems that provide the RMS, and confirm that security holes have not been created.
Additionally, the healthcare organization should confirm each RMS provider's security level is kept
appropriate.
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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
It is necessary to document and comply with the following items to adjust the ISMS:
⎯ security policy;
⎯ security measures standard;
⎯ mapping of security policy;
⎯ selection of solutions;
⎯ operation execution rule;
⎯ security auditing standards;
⎯ security audit and audit trail.
A healthcare organization should write items into the maintenance contract or agreement between the
healthcare organization and RMS provider that the RSC implements to ensure appropriate measures in the
RSC. As a result, the healthcare organization will distribute the obligation and the responsibility concerning the
protection of personal information during maintenance work to the RMS provider through the contract and
agreement. The healthcare organization shall construct the appropriate ISMS and, at the same time, shall put
into writing in the maintenance contract or the business consignment contract the obligation on the part of the
RMS provider of providing supervision as the final authority in charge of personal information management.
The risk analysis and measures are illustrated in this part of ISO/TR 11633 by the ISMS method. Therefore, it
is thought that constructing the remote maintenance service security (RSS) with this content will bring
advantages to both the healthcare organization and the RSC. When the content of this risk assessment is not
complete, additional risk assessment need only be done on parts that are missing.
4.2 Compliance scope
The coverage of the ISMS in the operational model described in Clause 6 of ISO/TR 11633-1 is as follows:
⎯ target device for maintenance in healthcare facility (HCF);
⎯ internal network of healthcare organization;
⎯ route from an rms access point in healthcare organization to the RSC;
⎯ internal network of the RSC;
⎯ equipment management in the RSC.
Because the following risks exist independent of the presence of the RMS, they are excluded from the
coverage of the ISMS of this clause:
⎯ threats related to availability of equipment and software that treats protected health information(PHI);
⎯ threats related to computer virus;
⎯ threats related to staff which pertain to adoption, education and training.
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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
4.3 Security policy
In 5.1.1 of ISO/IEC 27002:2005, the desired content to be included in a basic policy is prescribed, as follows:
a) a definition of information security, its overall objectives and scope and the importance of security as an
enabling mechanism for information sharing;
b) a statement of management intent, supporting the goals and principles of information security in line with
the business strategy and objectives;
c) a framework for setting control objectives and controls, including the structure of risk assessment and risk
management;
d) a brief explanation of the security policies, principles, standards and compliance requirements of
particular importance to the organization, including:
⎯ compliance with legislative, regulatory, and contractual requirements,
⎯ security education, training, and awareness requirements,
⎯ business continuity management,
⎯ consequences of information security policy violations;
e) a definition of general and specific responsibilities for information security management, including
reporting information security incidents;
f) references to documentation which may support the policy, e.g. more detailed security policies and
procedures for specific information systems or security rules users should comply with.
When these considerations are applied to RSS, it is necessary to secure the availability of the system, and to
secure the integrity, readability, and preservation of patient personal information.
It is necessary for the technical, systematic, human resources and physical safety measures of the RSS to be
specified in a basic security policy of the RSS.
The following explanations assume large-scale integrated HCF. Since it is possible that the RSC which
receives RMS exists in two or more sections of a large-scale HCF, a united management policy is needed.
When the HCF scale and the operation form are different from large-scale integrated HCF, it is important to
implement in conformity with the actual situation.
4.4 Assessing risks
In risk assessment, analysis of information assets is performed with regard to the following.
⎯ What threats exists?
⎯ To what extent is each threat possible and what is its frequency of occurrence?
⎯ When the threat is actualized, how much influence does it exert?
The technique of the analysis is broadly classified into the following four approaches.
a) Baseline approach
This is a technique for analysing risk based on the standards and guidelines that are required in the target
field. This approach measures security based on standard risk assessment done beforehand in industry.
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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
Though it is advantageous from the perspective of time and cost because the risk need not be evaluated by
oneself, the adaptability of the standardized risks to the risks of a specific organization can be problematic.
b) Detailed risk analysis
Carrying out a detailed risk assessment includes risk analysis of details, and an appropriate management plan
for management to select. A sizable budget for cost and time are needed for the risk assessment, including
securing necessary human resources.
c) Combined approach
This approach combines the baseline approach with the detailed risk analysis and it has the advantages of
each.
d) Informal approach
This approach implements risk analysis by exploiting the knowledge and the experience of the staff of the
organization. It is difficult for a third party to evaluate the resulting risk analysis because the method is not
structured.
The RMS is related to the healthcare organization and the RSC, so the risk analysis should be what both can
agree upon. In this part of ISO/TR 11633, the typical use case is modelled, and the risk assessment
concerning this model is carried out. Risk analysis by baseline approach a) and the combined approach of c)
is enabled by using this risk assessment result. See Table A.1 for the result of the risk assessment. Table A.1
contains the selection of appropriate control purpose and management plan in ISO/IEC 27001 from the result
of risk analysis in ISO/TR 11633-1. Table A.1 conforms to ISO/IEC 27001, and is composed of
11 management fields and 133 management plans.
The measures prescribed here specify the procedures which should be observed, at least in performing RMS.
The healthcare organization, which is also the administrator of personal information, should evaluate whether
the RSC conforms to this part of ISO/TR 11633, and should request that appropriate measures be taken if it
does not. Moreover, if the healthcare organization's security level is below the level specified in this part of
ISO/TR 11633, necessary measures will have to be put in place. Each RMS provider is expected to implement
necessary measures in order to achieve the requirements described in this part of ISO/TR 11633.
4.5 Risks to be managed
This subclause explains some examples from the viewpoint of personal information protection to avoid risks,
which should be especially noted in an RMS. It is important to implement sufficient measures against these
risks. The risk discussed here is a mere example; the management of other risks is also important.
a) When the RSC handling personal information is managed by the healthcare organization.
In this case, the point that needs particular attention is a leak of information by the third party. Consideration
needs to be given to information displayed on computer screens in the work environment and information
printed out on paper, as well as to the threat of hacking into the system. The main risks are as follows:
⎯ viewing of screens by persons other than persons concerned in RSC;
⎯ leakage in third party trust;
⎯ leakage from logs generated when data is analysed, from printed paper or cache memory, etc.;
⎯ leakage in the network.
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ISO/TR 11633-2:2009(E)
b) When the RSC accesses equipment of the healthcare organization for maintenance by the administrative
authority.
In this case, the points that need particular attention are operator error and inappropriate access to the
computer (submit operations that are permitted). The main risks are as follows:
⎯ destruction of data in target device due to an operator mistake;
⎯ destruction of data in target device due to malicious or subversive activities;
⎯ leakage and destruction of more important information due to inside intrusion via the maintenance
device.
c) When the RSC updates the software.
In this case, care is required not to install malicious software and computer viruses, etc., into the target
devices. The main risks are as follows:
⎯ leakage and destruction of data in target device due to malicious software;
⎯ leakage and destruction of important information via internal intrusion due to a computer virus.
4.6 Identification of risks that are not described in this part of ISO/TR 11633
In this part of ISO/TR 11633, risk assessment is performed in accordance with the typical model, so the other
use cases are outside its scope. If a business model is different from the model that this part of ISO/TR 11633
assumes, the risk assessment results of this part of ISO/TR 11633 can be misappropriated. There is also a
possibility that not all cases can be covered. When coverage of all cases is not possible, it is necessary to
conduct a detailed risk analysis using the combined risk assessment approach, not described by this part of
ISO/TR 11633.
The risk assessment method in the detailed risk analysis is explained in ISO/TR 11633-1. By adopting the
methods of ISO/TR 11633-1, the results of a risk assessment guided by a different busines
...